By: Kamran Bokhari  

Geopolitically, a trip to Iran could not come at a better time. Iran is an  emerging power seeking to exploit the vacuum created by the departure of U.S.  troops from Iraq, which is scheduled to conclude in a little more than three  months. Tehran also plays a major role along its eastern border, where  Washington is seeking a political settlement with the Taliban to facilitate a  U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The Islamic republic simultaneously is trying to steer popular  unrest in the Arab world in its favor. That unrest in turn has significant  implications for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an issue in which Iran has  successfully inserted itself over the years. The question of the U.S.-Iranian  relationship also looms — does accommodation or confrontation lie ahead? At the  same time, the Iranian state — a unique hybrid of Shiite theocracy and Western  republicanism — is experiencing intense domestic power struggles.

This is the geopolitical context in which I arrived at Imam Khomeini  International airport late Sept. 16. Along with several hundred foreign guests,  I had been invited to attend a Sept. 17-18 event dubbed the “Islamic Awakening” conference, organized by the office of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.  Given the state of Iranian-Western ties and my position as a senior analyst with  a leading U.S.-based private intelligence company, the invitation came as  surprise.

With some justification, Tehran views foreign visitors as potential spies  working to undermine Iranian national security. The case of the   American hikers jailed in Iran (two of whom were released the day of my  return to Canada) provided a sobering example of tourism devolving into  accusations of espionage.

Fortunately for me, STRATFOR had not been placed on the list of some 60  Western organizations (mostly American and British think tanks and civil society  groups) banned as seditious in early 2010 following the failed Green Movement  uprising. Still, the Iranian regime is well aware of our views on Iranian  geopolitics.

In addition to my concerns about how Iranian authorities would view me, I  also worried about how attending a state-sponsored event designed to further  Iranian geopolitical interests where many speakers heavily criticized the United  States and Israel would look in the West. In the end, I set my trepidations  aside and opted for the trip.

Geopolitical Observations in Tehran

STRATFOR CEO and founder George Friedman has written of geopolitical  journeys, of how people from diverse national backgrounds visiting other  countries see places in very different ways. In my case, my Pakistani heritage,  American upbringing, Muslim religious identity and Canadian nationality allowed  me to navigate a milieu of both locals and some 700 delegates of various Arab  and Muslim backgrounds. But the key was in the way STRATFOR trains its analysts  to avoid the pitfall that many succumb to — the blurring of what is really  happening with what we may want to see happen.

The foreigner arriving in Iran immediately notices that despite 30 years of  increasingly severe sanctions, the infrastructure and systems in the Islamic  republic appear fairly solid. As a developing country and an international  pariah, one would expect infrastructure along the lines of North Korea or Cuba.  But Iran’s construction, transportation and communications infrastructure shares  more in common with apartheid-era South Africa, and was largely developed  indigenously.

Also notable was the absence of any visible evidence of a police state.  Considering the state’s enormous security establishment and the recent unrest  surrounding the Green Movement, I expected to see droves of elite security  forces. I especially expected this in the northern districts of the capital,  where the more Westernized segment of society lives and where I spent a good bit  of time walking and sitting in cafes.

Granted, I didn’t stay for long and was only able to see a few areas of the  city to be able to tell, but the only public display of opposition to the regime  was “Death to Khamenei” graffiti scribbled in small letters on a few phone  booths on Vali-e-Asr Avenue in the Saadabad area. I saw no sign of Basij  or Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel patrolling the streets, only  the kind of police presence one will find in many countries.

This normal security arrangement gave support to STRATFOR’s view from the  very beginning that the unrest  in 2009 was not something the regime couldn’t contain. As we wrote then and  I was able to see firsthand last week, Iran has enough people who — contrary to  conventional wisdom — support the regime, or at the very least do not seek its  downfall even if they disagree with its policies.

I saw another sign of support for the Islamic republic a day after the  conference ended, when the organizers arranged a tour of the mausoleum of the  republic’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. We visited the large complex  off a main highway on the southern end of town on a weekday; even so, numerous  people had come to the shrine to pay their respects — several with tears in  their eyes as they prayed at the tomb.

Obviously, the intensity of religious feelings varies in Iran, but a  significant stratum of the public remains deeply religious and still believes in  the national narrative of the revolutionary republic. This fact does not get  enough attention in the Western media and discourse, clouding foreigners’ understanding of Iran and leading to misperceptions of an autocratic clergy  clinging to power only by virtue of a massive security apparatus.

In the same vein, I had expected to see stricter enforcement of religious  attire on women in public after the suppression of the Green Movement. Instead,  I saw a light-handed approach on the issue. Women obeyed the requirement to  cover everything but their hands and faces in a variety of ways. Some women wore  the traditional black chador. Others wore long shirts and pants and scarves  covering their heads. Still others were dressed in Western attire save a scarf  over their head, which was covering very little of their hair.

The dress code has become a political issue in Iran, especially in recent  months in the context of the struggle  between conservative factions. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has  encountered growing opposition from both pragmatic and ultraconservative forces,  has come under criticism from clerics and others for alleged moral laxity when  it comes to female dress codes. Even so, the supreme leader has not moved to  challenge Ahmadinejad on this point.

Ahmadinejad and the Clerical-Political Divide

In sharp contrast with his first term, Ahmadinejad — the most ambitious and  assertive president since the founding of the Islamic republic in 1979 — has  been trying to position himself as the pragmatist in his second term while his  opponents come out looking like hard-liners. In recent months his statements  have become less religiously informed, though they have retained their  nationalist and radical anti-Western tone.

For example, his speech at the conclusion of the second day of the conference  on the theme of the event, Islamic Awakening, was articulated in non-religious  language. This stood in sharp contrast to almost every other speaker.  Ahmadinejad spoke of recent Arab unrest in terms of a struggle for freedom,  justice and emancipation for oppressed peoples, while his criticism of the  United States and Israel was couched in terms of how the two countries’ policies  were detrimental to global peace as opposed to the raw ideological vitriol that  we have seen in the not too distant past.

But while Iran’s intra-elite political struggles complicate domestic and  foreign policymaking, they are not about to bring down the Islamic republic — at  least not anytime soon. In the longer term, the issue at the heart of all  disputes — that of shared governance by clerics and politicians — does pose a  significant challenge to the regime. This tension has existed throughout the  nearly 32-year history of the Islamic republic, and it will continue to be an  issue into the foreseeable future as Iran focuses heavily on the foreign policy  front.

Iran’s Regional Ambitions

In fact, the conference was all about Iran’s foreign policy ambitions to  assume intellectual and geopolitical leadership of the unrest in the Arab world.  Iran is well aware that it is in competition with Turkey over leadership for the  Middle East and that Ankara is in a far better position than Iran economically,  diplomatically and religiously as a Sunni power. Nevertheless, Iran is trying to  position itself as the champion of the Arab masses who have risen up in  opposition to autocratic regimes. The Iranian view is that Turkey cannot lead  the region while remaining aligned with Washington and that Saudi Arabia’s lack  of enthusiasm for the uprisings works in Tehran’s favor.

The sheer number of Iranian officials who are bilingual (fluent in Persian  and Arabic) highlights the efforts of Tehran to overcome the ethno-linguistic  geopolitical constraints it faces as a Persian country trying to operate in a  region where most Muslim countries are Arab. While its radical anti-U.S. and  anti-Israeli position has allowed it to circumvent the ethnic factor and attract  support in the Arab and Muslim worlds, its Shiite  sectarian character has allowed its opponents in Riyadh and elsewhere to  restrict Iranian regional influence. In fact, Saudi Arabia remains a major  bulwark against Iranian attempts expand its influence across the Persian Gulf  and into Arabian Peninsula, as has been clear by the success that the Saudis  have had in containing the largely Shiite uprising in Bahrain against the  country’s Sunni monarchy.

Even so, Iran has developed some close relations across the sectarian divide,  something obvious from the foreign participants invited to the conference. Thus  in addition to the many Shiite leaders from Lebanon and Iraq and other parts of  the Islamic world, the guest list included deputy Hamas leader Mousa Abu  Marzook; Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) chief Ramadan Abdullah Shallah; a  number of Egyptian religious, political, intellectual and business notables; the  chief adviser to Sudanese President Omar al Bashir as well as the leader of the  country’s main opposition party, Sadiq al-Mahdi; a number of Sunni Islamist  leaders from Pakistan and Afghanistan, including former Afghan President  Burhanuddin Rabbani whom I had the opportunity of speaking with only two days  before he was assassinated in Kabul; and the head of Malaysia’s main Islamist  group, PAS, which runs governments in a few states — just to name a few.

Tehran has had much less success in breaching the ideological chasm,  something evidenced by the dearth of secular political actors at the conference.  Its very name, Islamic Awakening, was hardly welcoming to secularists. It also  did not accurately reflect the nature of the popular agitation in the Arab  countries, which is not being led by forces that seek revival of religion. The  Middle East could be described as experiencing a political awakening, but not a  religious awakening given that Islamist forces are latecomers to the cause.

A number of my hosts asked me what I thought of the conference, prompting me  to address this conceptual discrepancy. I told them that the name Islamic  Awakening only made sense if one was referring the Islamic world, but that even  this interpretation was flawed as the current unrest has been limited to Arab  countries.

While speaker after speaker pressed for unity among Muslim countries and  groups in the cause of revival and the need to support the Arab masses in their  struggle against autocracy, one unmistakable tension was clear. This had to do  with Syria, the only state in the Arab world allied with Iran. A number of  speakers and members of the audience tried to criticize the Syrian regime’s  efforts to crush popular dissent, but the discomfort this caused was plain.  Syria has proven embarrassing for Iran and even groups like Hezbollah, Hamas and  PIJ, which are having a hard time reconciling their support for the Arab unrest  on one hand and supporting the Syrian regime against its dissidents on the  other.

The Road Ahead

Attending this conference allowed me to meet and observe many top Iranian  civil and military officials and the heads of Arab and other Muslim non-state  actors with varying degree of relationships with Tehran. Analyzing them from a  distance one tends to dismiss their ideology and statements as rhetoric and  propaganda. Some of what they say is rhetoric, but beneath the rhetoric are also  convictions.

We in the West often expect Iran to succumb to international pressure, seek  rehabilitation in the international community and one day become friendly with  the West. We often talk of a U.S.-Iranian  rapprochement, but at a strategic level, the Iranian leadership has other  plans.

While Iran would like normalized relations with Washington and the West, it  is much more interested in maintaining its independence in foreign policy  matters, not unlike China’s experience since establishing relations with the  United States. As one Iranian official told me at the conference, when Iran  re-establishes ties with the United States, it doesn’t want to behave like Saudi  Arabia or to mimic Turkey under the Justice and Development Party.

Whether or not Iran will achieve its goals and to what extent remains  unclear. The combination of geography, demography and resources means Iran will  remain at the center of an intense geopolitical struggle, and I hope for further  opportunities to observe these developments firsthand.

Geopolitical Journey: Iran at a Crossroads is republished with permission of STRATFOR.